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Toward a Right to Redundancy Compensation 
Lori Grantham* 
In Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck ( 1995) the Court of Appeal held that in som,e circumstances 
a worker might be entitled to compensation for redundancy, even though his or her contract 
of employment did not provide for it. 1 The decision has attracted sustained and vociferous 
criticism. In the opinion of its detractors, if the deeision is not actually contrary to the terrns 
of the Employment Contracts Act then it is certainly inconsistent with "the clear intentions 
of the Government ... " (Kerr, 1995: 97, 99). 
The source of this criticism lies in the contractual analysis which under pins the Employment 
Contracts Act. 2 Classical contract doctrine maintains that the contract contains all the rights, 
duties and interests of the parties. As such it represents a voluntary allocation of the risks 
associated with the bargain, the tertns of which d,efine each parties' expectations in regard to 
perfortnance and compensation for failur~e to perforn1. 3 The contractual allocation of risk also 
operates to exclude the possibility of entitlements that are not specified in the contract. 
Against this background the criticism of Bilderbeck is understandable. The Court of Appeal's 
apparent willingness to find rights to redundancy compensation outside the tertns of the 
contract seems wholly at odds with the contractual analysts. There are, however, grounds to 
• 
2 
3 
M.Com. (Auckland). This paper was part of a thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Commerce at the 
University of Auckland. 
While increasingly employment contracts will make specific provision for r~edundancy, in the recent 
survey conduct,ed for the law finn Russell Me Veagh McKenzie Bartleet & Co. ( 1995) only half of the 
employment contracts made any provision for redundancy compensation. In this light, the establishment 
of a right to compensation that is outside the ~contractual arrangem,ent is vitally important to both 
employer and worker. 
See Russell, A. (1995) and Harbridg,e, R. (ed.) (1993). 
Thus to take a simple example, when I agree to sell my car, by agreeing on a particular price l accept 
the risk that in the near future the car will not greatly appreciate in va.lue and that an alternative 
investment will be as profitable, while the buy~er accepts the risks associated with the condition of the 
car. 
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The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to tllat 
a contract to have entitlements or · beyond thole 
to consider whether, in the context of the ~ 
apart from those recognised in the contlact that justify protedioD. The 
presented here is that, at least in the context of , the very 
considerations that have lead to the criticisn1 of Btlderbeck, may justify a rlPt to 
irrespective of the actual terlllS of the contract. Once it is that the contract is 
longer an exclusive source of rights and that a worker's · are not wWy 
the contract, then the respect for private rights that so heavily imbues the policies of dle 
Right", 4 den1ands equal respect for extra-contractual rights . 
• 
Extra-contractual interests 
In recent years there has been a move to provide protection for the parties to a contract either 
by modifying the contract or by introducing new te1·1ns. This protection is ilrespective of the 
actual bargain struck by the parties involved. These developments have lead some to 
that the fundamental nature of contract has changed. In particular, that a bargain no longer 
exclusively reflects the voluntarily assumed obligations of the parties, but in fact comprises 
rights and duties imposed by law to serve broader social concerns (McLauchlan, 1992). 
The analysis of contract as a purely voluntary phenomenon reached its high point in the 
nineteenth century. The rights and duties of the parties were conceived of as arising from the 
parties' voluntary acts and the law merely gave effect to those obligations without either 
supplementation or, except in extreme cases, 5 limitation. 6 While such a model of contract 
served Victorian England and early colonial New Zealand well enough it became increasingly 
trained in the latter part of the twentieth century. As the Oxford jurist and contract scholar 
Atiyah (1979) convincingly demonstiated in the 1970s, the contract could no longer be 
explained purely by virtue of voluntarily assumed obligations. Rather, rights and duties were 
s 
6 
Particularly the work of libertarians such as Hayek, F. (1944) and Nozick, R. (1974). The application 
of libertarian philosophy to the labour market is explicit in the seminal work of Epstein, R. (1984). See 
also, Russell, A. (1995), Wallis, P. (1992) and Haworth, N. in Sharp, A. (ed.) (1994). Haworth 
characterises the philosophy of the ''New Right" as liberal. However, the emphasis on a reduced role 
for the state, individual rights and responsibilities and the explicit reliance placed on theorists such as 
Hayek and Epstein suggest that the ''New Right" is more appropriately characterised as libertarian: see 
Ogus, P. ( 1994). 
For example, where the contract was for the commission of an illegal or immoral act. 
This is usually referred to as the "will theory" of contract: Generally see, Burrows, et al. (1988). 
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the product of a range of principles, some of which were infortned by the parties' voluntary 
acts while others by considerations of public policy, reasonable expectation and fair dealing. 7 
• 
Perhaps because of our size8 or national character these insights have had a significant impact 
on contract doctrine in New Zealand. As McLauchlan (1992: 436) has noted the: 
doctrines of die general law of contract in this part of the world have been transfonned as a 
result of major judicial initiatives, particularly by the High Court o.f Australia, and, most 
notably in New Zealand, legislative reforms. Those elements of the so-called classical law of 
contract that survived the judicial and legislative inroads of the first 70 years of this century 
are gradually being supplemented and overtaken by a body of law which, inter alia, enforces 
some previously unenforceable promises and grants relief from some previous.ly enforceable 
promises, often in accordance with a variety of broad standards such as fairness and fair 
dealing, reasonable expectations, legitimate commercial expectations, unconscionability, good 
faith, and even "the confident assumptions of the commercial parties". 
Whether it is correct to infer a sea-change, or whether, less radically, we are merely seeing 
contract knocked from its pedestal as the exclusive regulator of voluntary relationships9 is 
perhaps a matter best left to jurists. For present purposes, it is enough to establish, on 
whatever doctrinal basis, that a party to a contract may have entitlements that go beyond those 
expressly stated in the contract. The illustrations of such extra-contractual inter~ests are not 
hard to fmd. 
One important area in which society, both by statute and through the courts, has recognised 
interests beyond existing legal entitlements is that of claims by spouses, whether legal or de 
facto, to a share in assets on the ending of the relationship. Currently, on the te11nination of 
a marriage the husband and the wife are entitled to share equally in the matrimonial property, 
irrespective of which partner is the legal owner of the particular asset. 10 In the context of 
the de facto marriag~es the courts have made it clear that there may be expectations created that 
the go ~ell beyond strict legal entitlements. 11 These expectations, where reasonable, are given 
ther effect to by the law because of judgments made about the nature of society and what social 
be 
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Signs of this reality are apparent in Lord Wilberforce's ~comment in National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina 
(Northern) Ltd [1981] A.C. 675, 696, that "I think that the movement of the law of contract is away 
from a rigid theory of autonomy towards the discovery - or I do not hesitate to say imposition - by the 
courts of just solutions, which can be ascribed to reasonable men in the position of the parties." 
Reynolds, F. (1995) suggested that radical reform was much easi·er in New Zealand precisely because 
we are small. 
Brennan, G. ( 1990). 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
See the Court of Appeal's decisions in Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327 and Lankow v Rose 
I[ 1995] I N .Z.L.R. 277. See also Muschinski v Dodds [ 1985] 160 C.L.R. 583 and Baumgartner v 
Baumgartner [ 1987] 164 C.L.R. 13 7. 
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Contracts for the purchase of consumer goods and the provision of consumer finance also give 
rise to entitlements that go beyond those specified in the contract. For example, the 
Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 implies warranties into all consumer contracts regarding the 
quality of the goods purchased. These warranties are · ·ve of the actual ag•eement 
reached by the parties concerned. Most importantly, they cannot be contlacted out of. 
Another example is where a purchaser borrows money to buy goods, whether it is a television 
or a car. Once again, obligations are imposed and rights created that are h1espective of the 
actual intention of the parties. 12 In both cases the obligations reflect a detennination that 
consumers have, or ought to have, interests and entitlements that go beyond what is 
customarily found in purely voluntary agreements. 
New Zealand, in particular, has seen the rapid development of notions of unconscionability. 13 
It is now well established that contracts can be modified or set aside entirely because the 
tertns are considered too harsh or are being exercised in ways that are unfair. Typically, such 
concerns arise where there are special circumstances such as a gross disparity of bargaining 
power, or a lack of mental capacity, education or worldliness, which deprives the individual 
of the ability to make a judgement in his or her best interests. Although unconscionability 
usually leads to a contract being set aside, as opposed to creating new teiitls, the doctrine is 
nevertheless a recognition that the contract is not, in all cases, the best or the exclusive 
regulator of the parties' relationship. 
While it perhaps goes too far to suggest, as did one American scholar (Gilmore, 1974) that 
contract as a purely consensual device is dead, the illustrations above do clearly demonstrate 
that the contractual statement of rights, duties and entitlements is no longer necessarily 
exhaustive of the parties' interests. There is now an acceptance that a party to a contract may 
have expectations and interests that are worthy of protection even though they may not be 
stated in the contract. Most importantly, there is a recognition that the contract's silence as 
to these interests does not deny either their claim to protection or the law's ability to protect 
them. 
A worker's interests 
The existence of rights and interests independent of those agreed to in a contract may provide 
a basis for, and justification of, a general right to compensation for redundancy. The 
argument is as follows. Where a worker has a "right" to compensation for redundancy the 
law will lend its weight in protecting and enforcing that right. This proposition is accepted 
by neo-classical theorists and others alike. Neo-classical theorists, however, would limit the 
source of such a right to the contract itself. 14 As we have seen, however, society has 
rejected the assumption that rights are exclusively contractual. Rights and entitlements may 
12 Credit Contracts Act 1981. The Fair Trading Act 1986 also modifies consensual agreements. 
13 Generally see, Burrows, et al. ( 1988) and Finn, P. ( 1994). 
14 The leading advocate of this view is Epstein, R. ( 1984 ). 
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his been such an interest arises out of the level of remuneration a worker receives 
bis or her labour. Barron (1984), for example, sees the worker's claim to compensation 
ndundancy as a return on the capital which the worker has invested in the business. 16 
By not bargaining as forcefully as they might, and thereby foregoing additional remuneration, 
workers thenaselves furnish the employer with additional business capital. This additional 
capital is "contributed" by the worker as, in essence, the price for job · . When the 
worker is · and the implicit promise of job security is repudiated, the worker is 
aatitled to withdraw their capital investtnent. In the case of an express provision for 
RJChandancy compensation, the right of withdrawal is explicit. But even where there is no 
express provision, the implicit agteement under which the workers forego additional wages 
gives them a right, outside of the contract, to compensation. 17 
Although theoretically attractive, there are a number of difficulties in resting an exb·a-
contractual right to redundancy compensation on an expropriation of capital. First, where the 
redundancy is merely to enhance profits the expropriation that lies at the heart of this 
approach is readily identifiable. However, where the fittlt has not been profitable, or is 
insolvent, it is much harder to identify the whereabouts of the worker's "capital". If the firm 
is insolvent it is at least arguable that the worker's capital has been lost. On dismissal, 
therefore, the worker's interest in the firtn is exhausted. Secondly, the approach is weakened 
by two assumptions: that the worker would have been able to gain additional remuneration 
had they been more forceful in their negotiations, and that they did in fact forego the 
additional wages. To date these assumptions are untested, and neo-classicalists would argue 
that it would be unlikely that such a power would exist in many, if any, cases. 
Necnsity 
. 
An interest sufficient to give rise to protection may also be found in the reliance placed by 
the worker, his or her family and, indeed, the entire community on the employer. This 
15 See also Solow, R. ( 1992). 
16 See also Collins, H. ( 1994 ). 
17 As Collins ( 1994) has noted, this argument can also be framed in tenns of the Marxist conception of 
surplus profits. 
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interest has been framed in terms of reliance, though this is merely a manifestation of the 
more general moral principle of necessite oblige.•• This principle asserts that a duty of care 
arises where one person is heavily dependent upon another. It is most clearly manifested in 
the duties owed by parents to care and provide for their children. 
In the employment context this reliance arises in a number of fortns. First, there is the 
worker's dependence on the employer for his income. A dependency that extends to the 
. 
worker's family and to an extent the entire community. Second, the worker depends on the 
employer, or more precisely the job, for his or her social status and sense of self-worth. In 
recent years there has been a growing awareness of the importance of one's job in modern 
society. In particular, that a job is not merely a source of income, but establishes one's place 
in society and is an important mechanism through which the individual attains self-esteem and 
self-worth. 19 
'This approach is also not without its difficulties. First, in its strongest fottll the approach 
argues a level of dependence, which apart from single employer towns,20 is unlikely to occur 
very often. Second, the concept is inherently vague as to content. While one may be able 
to identify a relationship of dependence, defming the content of the obligation which then 
arises is more difficult. Is it, for example, merely to take account of the worker's 
dependence, in essence a duty of consideration, or must the employer, as with a parent for a 
child, provide for all the worker's worldly and spiritual needs? 
In the final analysis, however, the undoubted dependence of the worker, and the community, 
on the employer provides a strong foundation for the recognition of some type of interest in 
the worker to continued employment or compensation. The difficulty that remains is what 
the content of this entitlement should be. Collins (1994: 152) has suggested that at best it 
amounts to "a duty upon the employer to contribute to income maintenance after the dismissal 
to the extent that this is fmancially possible." 
Personhood 
A closely related approach focuses directly upon the relationship between the worker, the job 
and the worker's sense of self-worth and personhood. Two interrelated strands of reasoning 
can be identified. First, as described above, there is the view that the job, with its attendant 
role in defining the individual's place in society, is essential to maintaining self-esteem and 
dignity. The influence of this approach is seen across the socio-political spectrum, from the 
work of socialist theorists s~ch as Gorz ( 1989) to the Roman Catholic Church's views on the 
rights of workers. 21 
18 Honore, P. ( 1987). 
19 See text following note 21. 
20 For example, Patea and Mosgiel, see Peck, L. ( 1984). 
21 See Finnigan, P. (1993). 
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The second strand, 22 which may be traced back through the work of philosophers such as 
Locke (1980), takes as its premise the individual's ownership of his or her body and from that 
extends the individual's right to the fruit of his or her labour. As Locke (1980: ch.v, para. 
27) says, "every man has a property in his own person", from which it follows that the 
"labour of his body, and the work of his hands . . . are properly his." In this way, an 
individual's work, job and the fruits of that labour are all intimately connected with the 
individual's rights as a person. 
While both strands illuminate concerns that are both deep and primitive there are again 
difficulties. In respect of the Lockean concept the limitations inherent in the theory have been 
widely debated. 23 In respect of the former conception, although the importance of work to 
the individual is well established, the implications of these perceptions tend to be more 
appropriately addressed by governmental policy rather than by the imposition of obligations 
on individual employers. 
Distributive justice 
As Collins ( 1994) notes, the worker's claim to compensation in the event of redundancy might 
be founded on a conception of ~distributive justice. 24 When the reduction of the work force 
improves the profitability of the fittn, the sacrifice made by the worker in achieving increased 
profitability may justify the redundant worker's claim to a share in the gain. In essence, the 
right to compensation for dismissal rests upon what is perceived to be a fair distribution of 
the ben~efits which result from the reorganisation of the firm. 
Expressed in these terms a claim based on distributive justice seems rather weak. First, it 
would only establish a right to compensation in cases where the redundancy was undertaken 
to enhance profits. Where it was brought about by the company's failure th~ere would be no 
gains, only losses to distribute. Second, in tertn of the quantum of compensation it would 
seem to produce perverse results. As the redundancy of the most highly paid would do the 
most to increase the firtn's profitability it would follow that the greatest amount of 
compensation would be paid to those who, arguably, are the least needing of it. 
While the concept of distributiv~e justice applied by ~Collins is limited to the specific benefits 
arising from a reorganisation of the firtn there are much broader concerns with the distribution 
of the wealth and benefits in society generally. 25 In this sense, justice is concerned with the 
the "basic structure of soci~ety, or more precisely the way in which the major social institutions 
the distribute th,e fundamental rights and duties and determine th,e division of advantages from 
social co-operation" (Rawls, 1972: 7). 
22 Generally see, Radin, M. ( 1982). 
23 See, for example, Epstein, R. in Paul, E., Frankel, F. and Paul, F. (1994). 
24 See also Mitchell D. ( 1995). 
25 Theophanous, A. ( 1994 ). 
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Since the "Age of Reason" dawned over two hundred years ago there have been various 
attempts to provide a theoretical account of justice, and what it means to say a society is a 
just one. This century has seen a number of important contributions to this on-going quest. 
While the libertarian ideals in the work of Hayek (1944) and Nozick (1974) have found 
expression in the policies of the "New Right", it is the work of John Rawls (1972), more than 
any other, 26 that awned a renaissance in social philosophy. Although sharing the respect for 
individual liberty and freedom of Hayek and Nozick, Rawls' concerns, and his conception of 
what is meant ·by "justice", is with human welfare. Toward this end, consistent with the 
liberal tradition, Rawls is prepared to accept an abridgement of individual rights where the 
strict enforcement of such rights is "unfair". 
ln determining what is a just society, and what is a just distribution of society's bounty, Rawls 
identified two governing principles, by which a just society may be deterntined. In their final 
fornt27 these principles are: 
• 
First Principle 
Second Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all. 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both: 
(a) 
(b) 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . . 
attached to offices and positions open to all 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
under 
At this point it is necessary to say a few things about the content and origins of these two 
principles. 
The first principle - a right to self respect 
The first principle is aimed at basic civil and human rights. It thus encompasses those rights 
which we usually associate with civil rights: a right to participate in the political process, 
freedom of speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest and freedom of conscience and thought. 
Rawls' conception of liberty, however, goes beyond these rights, as such rights are only a 
specific manifestation of an overriding concern with self-respect or self-esteem. 28 In this 
context self-respect includes an individual's sense of self-worth and right to self-fulfilment. 
As Lyons (1984) notes, to experience a minimally decent and acceptable existence, one must 
think of one's own concerns to be worth something. Thus for Rawls the liberties guaranteed 
26 
27 
21 
But see: Davies, H. and Holdcroft, D. ( 1990); Theophanous, A. ( 1994); Grassi an, V. ( 1981) and Harris, 
P. ( 1980). 
Particulary in respect of the second principle, there was some refinement following the original 
statement of the principles in A Theory of Justice. 
Theophanous, A. ( 1994 ). 
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the 1111teat for those who are worst off. One of 
is tbat it readily the possibility of inequalities and accepts that they will 
All that is required is that there is some gain to the less A farther 
is the inconsistencies between Rawls' view and that of neo-classicists are 
as it might first be thought. For example, if one accepts that an allocatioD8lly 
market ultimately benefits all, the agg• egation of wealth in the hands of a few is not 
the lot of the least advantaged is improved by the agegation. 
second key element is the equality of access. This requires that access to the opportunity 
acquire advantages (wealth, income, power and authority) is available to all. Rawls' notion 
access is an extended one, however, comprising not only formal equality but also a "level 
· field". Thus, for example, it is not enough to make a job open to all with the 
~qualification, the opportunity to acquire the qualification must also be equal. 
The two principles discussed above are the criteria by which we may judge whether a society 
Is a just one. But we may ask, why are these principles appropriate, and wherein lies their 
DOIJnative force? The source of these principles and the feature which justifies redistribution 
in the case of inequalities, is to be found in the type of society to which rational people would 
The two central features of this agreement are first, that it is made in the "original 
position". This is at a hypothetical point of time before society has fo11111ed. Second, that the 
· are rational but must decide from behind a veil of ignorance. That is to say that at the 
time of the ag1 eement they are unable to predict what their position in that society will be or 
what natural advantages they might find themselves with in that society. This agreement 
would in Rawls' view give rise to the two principles of justice. 
This hypothetical, ex ante, social contract also provides the noiiitative justification for any 
redistribution that might be necessitated by the application of the two principles of justice. 
In much the same way as neo-classicists now rely upon voluntariness as the central, and 
exclusive, justification for the recognition of obligations, the voluntary (though hypothetical) 
agreement to the two principles of justice is the justification for the abridgement of any 
individual rights that these principles may entail. The individual having agreed to a rule that 
might entail redistribution of wealth at some later date, cannot complain that his or her rights 
are being infringed when the eventuality occurs. In short, one's "rights" to the wealth 
acquired are always conditional upon satisfaction of the two principles of justice. 
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Justice and the worker 
The redundancy of a worker would seem to invoke both principles of justice. The dismissal 
may infringe the first principle in that the worker is denied the opportunity of fulfilment as 
an individual. As we have seen the rights with which the first principle of justice are 
concerned encompass rights to self-respect and self-esteem. Work, as opposed to the income 
it generates, is an important factor in one's feeling of self-respect and self-worth. The lack 
of meaningful, potential-fulfilling work which undel'tnines the individual's self-respect and 
self-esteem thus seems to infringe the requirements for a just society. One might also add that 
the supposition that the employer may buy and sell the worker must come perilously close to 
infringing essential aspects of individual and political liberty. 29 
It may also be that a dismissal infringes the second principle. Although Rawls spoke 
primarily in tet·tns of equality of access to employment itself, it may nevertheless be within 
the spirit of Rawls' conception of justice to extend the right of access to the benefits flowing 
f~om the job. In a modern society a job, as well as a source of personal fulfilment, is a 
gateway through which an individual shares in the benefits and wealth of society. Thus, 
although a redundancy may not infringe the right of access to employment, there may still be 
a denial of access to those benefits that flow from the job. By depriving the worker of a job 
the worker is denied access to the economic and social benefits associated with being 
employed: income, pensions, medical services and status. Once this is accepted, the dismissal, 
whether because of the firtn's failure or a desire to enhance profits, results in an unjust 
distribution of the fundamental rights and benefits of society. It is this unjustness that calls 
for redistribution, the redistribution being effected by the provision of compensation. 
This conception of distributive justice differs from that envisaged by Collins in that we are 
no longer solely or exclusively concerned with the specific distributional issues arising out of 
individual redundancies and dismissals. Instead we are concerned with the distribution of all 
of society's rights and wealth. While the worker is employed, the inequalities are tolerable 
because the worker has an opportunity to partake of society's wealth. Although the employer 
"owns" a disproportionate amount of society's wealth, this ownership is consistent with the 
second of Rawls' principles: non-owners have an opportunity, through employment, to benefit, 
and the allocative efficiencies of the aggregation does benefit the least advantaged. Where, 
however, the worker is dismissed the inequalities in wealth distribution become "unjust", and 
the compensation payable becomes the mechanism by which this inequality is addressed.30 
At the risk of labouring the point, on this broader conception of distributive justice the 
worker's claim to compensation on a redundancy rests not on the specific features of the 
29 
30 
From a neo-classical perspective the element of voluntariness would save this analysis fonn charges that 
it is tantamount to slavery. One can of course take issue with the assumption that workers really have 
a choice. In an era where we seem to be heading in the direction of Nozick's ( 1974) minimal state, 
the alternatives are fast disappearing. 
One might respond that distributional concerns do not explain why it is the particular employer who 
must bear the costs of the redistribution. While an important point, the answer lies in the employer' s 
proximity to the worker and the causal role of the employer in the worker's disadvantage. 
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particular dismissal, but upon society's concern with social justice and a perception that some 
are unfairly disadvantaged. The redundancy itself is merely the occasion upon which the 
inequalities become intolerable and remedial action is taken. 
To test our conclusion that compensation for redundancy is necessary in a just society we can 
consider directly the social contract which underlies Rawls' identification of the two principles 
• 
of justice. As discussed, the principles which govern a just society are those to which rational 
individuals would agree, if that agreement were made from behind a veil of ignorance. We 
can, therefore, ask, would a rational individual, unable to predict whether he or she would at 
t some future point be worker or employer, or whether he or she would be naturally gifted, well 
educated or from an affluent background, .agree that compensation should be payable upon 
a redundancy? In the writer's opinion the answer is indisputably yes. 
In these tertns, as a basis for the worker's claim to compensation, distributive justice is both 
the most abstract and potentially the most compelling. It establishes a right to compensation 
that is independent of the particular factual circumstance or motivation for the dismissal, and 
one that is clearly vindicable against the employer rather than the state. It is a right, 
~ furthettnore, that draws tog~ether and gives a philosophically sound expression to many of the 
jo: insights which infottn~ed the other justifications ·discussed above. 
Ultimately, however, its force as a justification rests upon one's ~conception of what is a just 
distribution or a just society. From the standpoint of a libertarian such as Nozick (1974) a 
just distribution can .arise only from consensual or voluntary transactions, while at the other 
extreme socialists take equality as the governing concern (Ogus, 1994). In the final analysis, 
however, if we are to continue to live in close proximity to one another, and if society is to 
are survive at all, our choices may be more limited than w~e currently perceive. Bauman ( 1993) 
t of has recently suggested that for us to have a collective existence, to in fact have a society at 
~J all, depends upon the moral competence of its members: the regard held by the individual for 
ble the other, not merely conduct necessary to be in proximity to others. Bauman's point is that 
society's very existence is predicated upon the morality of its m~embers. It is the individual's 
regard for the other that mak~es society possible, rather than, as the "contractual" theorists such 
as Hobbes and Kant thought, society making moral conduct possible or necessary. For 
Bauman, as individuals we are inh~erently "other-regarding", and the attempts to rationalise this 
altruism, to justify why we act in the other's interest without thought of reciprocation, 
Jo destroys the essential nature of this altruism and therefore threatens the continuation of 
society. If society is to continue, th~erfor·e, it may be that the decisions to keep or dismiss 
the worker, the tetms on which it is ·done and the financial and moral support given in the 
the ·event of redundancy must not be based, at least exclusively, on the ~employ·er's self-interest, 
but upon the effects on the worker and what is right. 
Conclusion 
In the revival of the economic system associated with Adam Smith (1976, 1986) there has 
been a tend~ency to extol th·e virtues of the "invisibl·e hand" (1976: 184-5) of self-interest at 
the expense of justice and morality. Yet such matters wer·e central to Smith's wider concerns 
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with social philosophy. For Adam Smith, while mankind's self-interested outlook might play 
an important part in the greater plan, such tendencies were inimical to the existence of society. 
Smith recognised that if society is to survive we must on occasion put aside self-interest in 
favour of the interests of others. If, therefore, we are to pursue an economic policy based on 
Smith's "invisible hand" we would do well to recognise the limits Smith himself imposed on 
that policy. In short, the invisible hand of self-interest should be constrained by the more 
visible hand of compassion. 
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